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Abstract: This paper presents a case for
the non-fallaciousness ofpetitio principii in
the context where the only evidence which
can confirm the conclusion of an argument
has a content which is identical to the con-
tent of the conclusion. The more usual rhe-
torical and dialectical frameworks for the
analysis of fallacies are challenged for what I
describe as their proscriptive stance. As an
alternative to proscription, I recommend an
analysis of the context in which petitio ar-
guments occur. Such an analysis, I argue,
suggests the relaxation of a priority condi-
tion described by Waiton (l 985) and the rel-
evance to the present case of Sorensen's
(1991) analysis ofthe non-circularity ofcer-
tain 'P, therefore, P' arguments.
Resume: Cet article dernontre qu'une
petition de principe n'est pas
necesairernent fallacieuse dans un contexte
ou le seul appui pour une conclusion a un
contenu identique acelui de la conclusion.
le critique la position proscriptive des
approches courantes de la dialectique et
de la rhetorique. Au lieu de la proscrip-
tion.je conseille une analyse du contexte
dans lequel se presente la petition de
principe. Une telle analyse suggere un
assouplissement d 'une condition de
priorite decrite par Walton (1985).
J'emploie aussi l'analyse de Sorensen
(1991) selon laquelle certains arguments
ayant la forme «P, done P» ne sont pas
circulaires.
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Consider the following discussion from Woods and Walton (1982a):
A thesis may be refuted in what we call the weak sense when the discus-
sion shows that the answerer has clearly insufficient grounds for hold-
ing the thesis in question. However, it does not follow, from the fact that
I do not have enough evidence to show my thesis to be true, that my
thesis is false. For all I know, it may be true, yet I do not have sufficient
evidence to be able to show that it is true. In this kind of situation, we
can say that the thesis is refuted in the sense that its defence is demon-
strably inadequate. It can be seen, therefore, that the refutation in the
weak sense of a given proposition does not entitle one to claim that the
proposition is false and that its opposite is true. However, knowing that
one's thesis has been refuted in the weak sense is something very much
worth knowing. One comes to understand that, irrespective of whether
that thesis is true or false, one's grounds/or holding the thesis are inad-
equate, therefore, one's claim to know the thesis is deficient. (pp. 120-
121; italics in original).
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In relation to the passage quoted above, Woods and Walton explicitly reject the
following argument which is subsequent to the first 'however':
I do not have enough evidence to show my thesis to be true.
:. My thesis is false.
This particular formulation ofad ignorantiam 'is located within confirmation theory
as a confusion between the categories of"lack of confirming evidence" and "pres-
ence of disconfirming evidence" (Woods and Walton, 1978, p. 87). I will not
comment on Woods' and Walton's description of this argument as fallacious ex-
cept to say that this account does not represent their complete view of the falla-
ciousness or otherwise of this fallacy-rather, these writers view ad ignorantiam
as fallacious in some contexts of use and as non-fallacious in other contexts of
use. My concern is with the following argument by Woods and Walton which is
subsequent to the second 'however' of the above passage:
One's grounds for holding the thesis are inadequate.
:. One's claim to know the thesis is deficient.
By discussing the above argument my aim is to demonstrate that (1) Woods
and Walton have employed an example of petitio principii and yet (2) their em-
ployment ofthis so-called 'fallacy' is not only non-fallacious, but can also be seen
to be a mode of argument which is entirely warranted within the context in which
it is presented.
The question-at-issue in the above argument clearly relates to certain episte-
mological concerns, viz., the adequacy of the evidence (reasons) which can be
adduced in support of a thesis. Thus in order to understand any description of this
argument as question-begging, it is necessary to address these epistemological
issues. Through doing so we will examine both the way in which the premise
entails the conclusion (route (1) in the diagram below), and also the further entail-
ment relationship between conclusion and premise (route (2) in the diagram be-
low)':
One's grounds for holding the thesis are inadequate.
(PREMISE)
(1)
(CONCLUSION)
(2)
One's claim to know the thesis is deficient.
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I proceed by discussing the entailment relationship exhibited by route (I). Clearly
it is not my proposal that to have grounds for holding a thesis entails a claim to
knowledge for that thesis. To introduce such an entailment is to overlook all those
theses for which we have some degree of cognitive warrant but for which we
would still decline to use the title of knowledge. Indeed, knowledge under such an
entailment would be reduced in our language to the role normally attributed to
concepts such as presumption. To permit any such alterations in our concept of
knowledge is to remove it from the conceptual schemes which find their manifes-
tation in language.
There is, however, a condition under which a different form of the above
entailment is not only permissible but is conceptually necessary. Such a condition
relates to the adequacy of the grounds which support the thesis under considera-
tion. To query the adequacy of such grounds is to immediately remove any pos-
sibility of claiming knowledge. The entailment nature of this relationship (inad-
equacy ofgrounds for holding a thesis ~ impossibility of knowledge) is the very
route by which the sceptic launches his attacks on knowledge-by introducing
various forms ofCartesian demonology, the sceptic aims to undermine the grounds
of our claims to knowledge with the inevitable result that we can never claim to
know thatp.
It can thus be seen that the entailment relationship represented by route (1) is
most accurately described as being conceptually necessary-the very features of
our knowledge concept (at least the knowledge concept that functions within
human discourse) require an entailment relationship to exist: in faulting the grounds
that we hold for any thesis we are conceptually required to deny the possibility of
knowledge. However, we are still not at a position in our discussion to attribute the
label ofpetitio principii to the above argument. It must now be established that a
similar relationship, that of conceptual necessity, exists at route (2) in the dia-
gram.
To establish a relationship of conceptual necessity at route (2), we must con-
sider the entailment relation that exists between a claim to knowledge and the
grounds which support a thesis, or, more specifically, what is entailed by the
rejection of a knowledge claim. To describe any claim to knowledge as deficient
entails locating the source ofthe deficiency within the supportive warrant (grounds)
for the known thesis, Le.. the conclusion entails the premise. There is simply no
other way in which a knowledge-claim can be defeated-all error must ultimately
reside in the grounds that have been adduced for the known thesis. It may be
argued, of course, that such an entailment relation only exists if we are prepared
to interpret the premise as one's grounds for holding the thesis as knowledge are
inadequate-the argument could be advanced that even when the making of a
knowledge-claim is deficient, we may still possess perfectly adequate grounds for
holding a thesis in a lesser cognitive commitment than knowledge, e.g., presump-
tion. It may further be argued that such an interpretation of the premise is entirely
unwarranted in view ofthe fact that when the entailment relation between premise
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and conclusion was examined, a general and not a knowledge-specific interpreta-
tion of the premise was accepted. While it is true that my discussion of the entail-
ment relation involves a description of the thesis in the premise as a known thesis,
this is in no way essential to the issue being addressed by that entailment. For my
point is rather that the deficiency which is sufficient to defeat a claim to knowl-
edge would likewise be sufficient to defeat a claim of lesser cognitive commit-
ment. The slightest defect in grounds can preclude a claim to knowledge. Also,
however, a similar defect can preclude a claim to presumption-we only ever have
a tentative commitment to a presumption and this commitment is eroded at the
very onset of difficulties.
Thus it can be seen that route (2) in the above diagram represents an entail-
ment relation which is secured, in a similar manner to that of route (1), via a
conceptual analysis of knowledge. In formulating this account of petitio principii,
the logical study of knowledge entailments has featured prominently. Yet without
such considerations it is likely that the question-begging nature of this argument
would have altogether evaded us. It is hard to see how an analysis of petitio
principii can be conducted with any degree of success on the basis of formal
accounts alone-after all, the very essence ofthis 'fallacy' relates to the evidential
base of an argument's premises and whether or not the conclusion features in this
evidence, and any accurate assessment of such matters requires more than con-
tent- and context-insensitive formal approaches. These contrasting approaches to
the study ofpetitio can be demonstrated by comparing the view of Woods (1980)
A further advantage of this sort of formal approach is that it demonstrates
that, and the extent to which, possession or lack of target-properties (e.g.
circularity) is not a matter of parochial semantic status, and not a matter
either of parochial contextual and pragmatic features. (p. 58)
with that of Hull (1967):
The fallacy of reasoning in vicious circles does not belong to this class of
fallacies [formal fallacies]. Instead it is an example of what logicians call a
material fallacy. In diagnosing material fallacies both content and the use to
which the argument is being put play central roles. (p. 177)
We must now address the second motivation stated above for discussing this
argument-the issue of whether it truly warrants the title of 'fallacy' and, if not,
what features of this argument qualify it as a 'good' or 'correct' mode of reason-
ing.
As soon as we employ terms such as 'fallacy', 'good' and 'correct', we find
ourselves within the realm of normative knowledge. The study of the normative
aspect of argumentation generally proceeds in terms of a specification of criteria
on the basis ofwhich we describe some types ofargument as rationally acceptable
while other modes ofargument violate these criteria and are accordingly viewed as
fallacious. Numerous rhetorical and dialectical frameworks have been advanced
for the purpose ofargument evaluation. However, almost without exception, these
frameworks have opted -for a proscriptive stance towards petitio principii. This
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proscriptive stance is problematic for the reason that it fails to accommodate the
growing view that, in certain contexts of use, petitio principii represents an ac-
ceptable mode of argument. Indeed, this view receives indirect support from the
continuing failure of these rhetorical and dialectical frameworks to establish a
method of analysis which is effective in proscribing petitio principii. This con-
tinuing failure, I suggest, should force the proponents of these frameworks to
query whether petitio principii is a truly fallacious mode of reasoning, a mode of
reasoning which should be banned at all costs. As an example of this failure, I
examine Rescher's (1977) model of formal disputation and, in particular, his ef-
forts to proscribe sequences ofpetitio argument. The choice of Rescher's model
is motivated by a further consideration. For in proposing the view that petitio
principii is, in certain contexts, non-fallacious, I address specifically the setting of
cognitive inquiry (the inquiry, of which the petitio argument under discussion is a
part, is that of a theoretical analysis of the argument from ignorance). Rescher's
aim is similarly epistemological in nature:
We shall explore this particular sector of dialectics (formal disputation) to see
what epistemological lessons can be drawn from it in order to exhibit the
utility of such 'dialectics' for the theory of knowledge. The goal of this
exploration is the development of a dialectical model for the rationalization of
cognitive methodology-scientific inquiry specifically included.
(1977, p. x ii)
Rescher's approach to petitio principii is ambiguous to say the least. He clearly
legislates against the use of circular sequences on a number of occasions:
... It is necessary to preclude the repetitive-indeed circular sequence:"
PROPONENT OPPONENT
!P +-P
!P
This blockage is accomplished by adopting a special rule to proscribe the
simple repetition of a previous move. The reason for such a non-repetition
rule lies deep in the rationale of the process of disputation. A disputation
must be progressive: it must continually advance into new terrain. Since its
aim is to deepen the grounding of the contentions at issue, it must always
endeavour to improve upon the reasoning already laid out, in the interests of
achieving greater sophistication. Mere repetition would frustrate the aim of
the enterprise (1977, pp. 10-11; italics in original).
It must also be stressed that the diagram needs to be supplemented by the (already
mentioned) blockage rule which precludes the proponent from reasserting (or the
opponent from rechallenging) something he has effectively asserted (or challenged)
before. Examples of such blocked sequences are:
PROPONENT OPPONENT
!P
l--P= !P
+-P
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Or again:
PROPONENT
lP
P/Q&!Q
Q/P&!P
OPPONENT
+-P
+-Q
(1977, p.20)
Rescher clearly views these argument structures as dialectical moves which fail
'to deepen the grounding of the contentions at issue' and accordingly must be
prohibited through the use of blockage rules. However, even as Rescher is devel-
oping the mechanism which, it is expected, will proscribe circular sequences of
argument, further sequences ofcircular argument fail ofproscription by this mecha-
nism. Consider, in this regard, Rescher's endorsement of the following counter-
moves to cautious denial:
(1977, p. 11)
A cautious denial (or challenge) of the form +-P is simply the cautious
assertion of the negative thesis -P, It may thus be met either by
1. The categorical counterassertion
P or equivalently !P
or
2. A provisoed counterassertion of the form
P/Q&!Q
Placing countermove (1) within a proponent/opponent table as above, we arrive at
the following display:
OPPONENT
-p
PROPONENT
(1) !P+
(2) !--P=!P
In this way we end up with the very argument structure that Rescher's blockage
rule was intended to proscribe.' Clearly, to legislate completely against circular
arguments is no simple task. As this example demonstrates, circular argumenta-
tion would appear to be almost implicit in the very frameworks that we use to
discuss acceptable dialectical manoeuvres. While the response of dialectical and
rhetorical theorists has been to propose yet further rules which block petitio prin-
cipii, I suggest a somewhat different interpretation of the scenario that confronts
us. We can and must resist steadily increasing the number, complexity and range
of rules each time we come upon a circular argument which is acceptable by the
standards of the rule set. I propose instead that we query the very validity of the
project of prohibiting the circular argument at issue and set about describing the
features of the case within the context in which it occurs. It is only when we begin
to do so that we can fully appreciate the non-fallacious nature of petitio principii
-and many other fallacies as well.
Returning to the Woods and Walton (1982a) petitio:
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One's grounds for holding the thesis are inadequate.
:. One's claim to know the thesis is deficient.
we can attempt to specify the features of both the argument itself and the context
in which the argument is presented which justify an evaluation of non-fallacious-
ness for this example of petitio. In describing the above argument as a petitio, I
have demonstrated how the entailment relations which exist between premise and
conclusion and between conclusion and premise are secured within the concep-
tual 'logic' of knowledge. This analysis, however, resulted from a consideration
of both premise and conclusion content and it is to this content that we must
return if we are to establish the non-fallacious nature of this argument.
The very raison d'etre of argument consists in the functions which it serves:
'One of the commonest uses of arguments is to prove conclusions that are in
some way unknown or doubtful or that have been called into question' (Hull,
1967, p. 176). In order to prove any conclusion, irrespective of the type of proof
at issue, we require as premises those propositions which are most likely to in-
crease our certainty in the truth of the question-at-issue. This is not simply a
matter of amassing a large number of premises in the hope that the quantity of
propositions in the premise-set will be sufficient to force through the conclusion.
Rather, we select the premises we require with considerations of conclusion con-
tent in mind, where such selection inevitably involves judgements of relevance to
differentiate those propositions which can legitimately stand as evidence from
other propositions which are either irrelevant or less relevant.
Now our standard view of the propositions which form the premises of an
argument is that these propositions must be informative with respect to the propo-
sition which forms the conclusion of an argument. And in the achievement of this
end, it is argued that these propositions must possess a content which, while
relevant to, is sufficiently distinct from, the content of the proposition which
forms the conclusion. In most instances of argument this distinctness condition is
satisfied. When it is not satisfied, a petitio principii argument results. The issue,
then, is whether such a pattern ofjustification or grounding-the establishment of
a conclusion on the basis of a premise which is identical to the conclusion-is
rationally unacceptable or fallacious in all cases. It is my claim that this is not so.
For in certain contexts of cognitive inquiry-under conditions of evidential
bereftness, for example-it is rationally acceptable to validate a conclusion through
a premise of identical content on the grounds that to do otherwise would lead to
undesirable theoretical and practical consequences for the agent engaged in in-
quiry and to a devaluation of the type of reasoning involved. It is to a further
examination of these issues that I now turn.
It was described above how judgements of relevance are essential to any proc-
ess of evidence selection. These judgements are only possible in contexts where
some form of selection must be made between information which we require for
our deliberations and information which can quite safely be set aside. However, it
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would be a mistake to assume that all argumentation proceeds against such a
background of information. For as Perelman (1982) remarks 'Contrary to demon-
stration, which is developed in a well-defined system, argumentation most often
draws upon a very ill defined corpus of premises, and the theses upon which it is
based can be partially understood or implicit'. (pp. 48-49). Despite our best ef-
forts at securing empirical knowledge during cognitive inquiry, we are not infre-
quently confronted with contexts of extreme evidential bereftness. In such situa-
tions we can decide to (1) suspend judgement until such time as appropriate evi-
dence does become available, (2) continue in our inquiries employing the same
probative ground rules (standards of rational acceptability) that were employed
when evidential bereftness was not a consideration, or (3) continue in our inquiries
employing different standards of rational acceptability in full recognition of the
fact that our context is one of evidential bereftness.
The suspension of judgement in (1) is clearly one response, albeit a drastic
response, to the situation ofevidential bereftness-when a situation arises in which
appropriate evidence is lacking the inquirer quite simply desists from any further
activity within that particular process of inquiry. A similar suspension of judge-
ment constitutes a possible response by the inquirer to the relentless charges of
error on the part of the cognitive sceptic. (The sceptic, however, denies that we
can acquire 'appropriate evidence'-irrespective of the grounds that we present
for our beliefs, the sceptic simply continues to argue that we have failed to elimi-
nate situations x, y, z, etc. as possible sources of our sensory deception.) How-
ever, both cases of suspension, in addition to being drastic, are completely mis-
guided and for much the same reason. As for the inquirer who is responding to the
critical challenges of the cognitive sceptic, he cannot engage in 'a systematic
abstention from cognitive involvement' as a 'sure-fire safeguard against error'
(Rescher, 1977, p.97). For while it is true that his deliberations are at the level of
theoretical reasoning, where the emphasis is with the intellectual issues of truth
and inquiry, he can ill-afford to neglect the realm of praxis with its demands for a
rational basis. Of course, the sceptic is always at liberty to argue that appropriate
praxis is altogether compatible with the suspension ofjudgement-he may insist
on the sufficiency of noncognitive guides for action. However, mere success in
action is not what is at issue here. As Rescher (1980) argues:
Action in a purpose-realizing way is not enough for rationality-the suc-
cesses at issue may be wholly fortuitous and accidental. To meet the condi-
tions of rationality, we must not only do what realizes our aims, but do it in an
adequately grounded expectation that it will (or well may) realize them. And
this calls for the factual knowledge that this amalgam of technology-cum-
technique is appropriate to the tasks at hand. (pp. 219-220; italics in original)
Therefore, while suspension of judgement certainly guarantees that the inquirer
will not accept a falsehood, through adopting such a sceptical policy he runs the
much greater risk ofstultifying rational action on an indefinite basis-according to
the cognitive sceptic, after all, appropriate evidence will never be forthcoming.
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The inquirer who is confronted with the cognitive sceptic believes that he must
abandon rationality altogether in order to evade the sceptic's challenges-only
when he is completely outside of the enterprise of rationality, i.e., when he is no
longer advancing grounds for his beliefs or, indeed, holding beliefs, can he avoid
the sceptic's relentless challenges to the veracity ofthose grounds and beliefs. It is
this complete abandonment of rationality which renders the inquirer in this case
susceptible to a charge of stultifying action. The inquirer who confronts a situa-
tion of evidential bereftness, however, is committed to a rational enterprise-it is
his commitment to this enterprise, after all, which results in his suspension of
judgement in the case where the only alternative is to engage in the prohibited
reasoning characteristic of petitio principii. It may be argued, therefore, that the
above charge concerning the stultification of rational action does not apply to an
inquirer in a context of evidential bereftness this inquirer has a rational basis upon
which action can proceed. Yet it is a poor rationality indeed which prescribes a
policy of 'doing nothing' in the case where specific items of information or evi-
dence are not available: 'The task of rational inquiry is to provide information
about the world. And here, as elsewhere, "Nothing ventured, nothing gained" is
the operative principle' (Rescher, 1977, p. 97; italics in original). Inquiry, by its
very nature, must proceed in conditions ofless than complete information. Inquiry
is, after all, the process by means of which we obtain 'information about the
world', information which forms no part of our current cognitive commitments.
The issue for the inquirer is one of how to respond to situations of information
deprivation. To suspend judgement is to preclude the very possibility of acquiring
information and, ultimately, to fall foul of the type of practical considerations
described above. Rather than pursuing either of these destructive options for the
inquirer, 1 propose instead a positive conception ofpetitio principii. On this con-
ception petitio functions as a reasoning strategy which facilitates the progress of
an inquiry when evidence is lacking from that inquiry until such time as this infor-
mation or evidence deficit is resolved. Walton (1985) supports a broadly similar
conception ofpetitio principii, this time within a dialectical context:
The basic problem with this strong approach however, is that in many con-
texts of reasonable dialogue, an arguer cannot always demand more plausi-
ble premisses from his opponent immediately. The opponent must often be
given "room to argue", to proceed by way of premisses "not better known"
in the hope of eventually arriving at some premisses the other party will
accept as plausible. (p. 272)
Viewed within the context ofan inquiry, especially an inquiry in its early stages of
development, petitio principii constitutes an essential component of probative ra-
tionality-it is only a rather limited conception of inquiry, one based upon a linear
model of demonstration in which we pass from well known premises to less well
known conclusions, which makes this type of argument appear fallacious.
I turn now to an examination of the second option described above, that of con-
tinuing inquiry using the same criteria ofrational acceptability that are employed in
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contexts where evidential bereftness is not a consideration. As I see it, the effect
of such a move will be to condemn as fallacious many acceptable forms of argu-
ment,petitio principii among them. And a likely secondary effect will be a further
suspension of judgement on the part of the inquirer-if a particular argument
pattern isjudged to be fallacious by an inquirer's standards of rational acceptability
and, owing to constraints of evidence availability, this is the only pattern of argu-
ment that is available to the inquirer, then the inquirer is left with little choice but to
desist from any further activity within that inquiry. Returning to the central cause
of these effects, one must take cognizance of the fact that probative standards
cannot be applied in a context-insensitive manner across widely diverse evidential
settings. That which qualifies as acceptable evidence within the context of a dem-
onstration would represent a hyperbolical standard within the settings of inductive
and plausible argumentation. As Sidgwick (1893) remarks:
Logic sometimes sets out from the fact that only a perfectly "universal"
generalisation can properly serve as ground of inference; that if a rule be
admitted to have even a single (unspecified) exception, its value for infer-
ence is lost, since any given case may be that one exception in the absence
of knowledge to the contrary. And for some purposes this view is useful. But
we are now to look at another side of the truth, and one that has a closer
connection with the actual process of argument.
It is comparatively seldom in actual argument-never, perhaps, where a
really disputed or difficult question is raised-that we are able to rest our
case on a single faultless generalisation, like "all men are mortal" or "where
there is smoke there is fire". Inferences so supported are not in practice the
kind that encounter opposition. Where any doubt exists, our express or
apparent ground of inference is, nearly always, a looser kind of generalisa-
tion; we are obliged to make what use we can of broad truths which we know
to be incompletely universal. (pp. 23-24)
Even Sidgwick's 'broad truths which we know to be incompletely universal' rep-
resent a form ofevidence which is lacking from the context ofevidential bereftness
that is the focus of this discussion. Sidgwick's remarks, however, serve to remind
us that evidential standards cannot be applied to the normative evaluation ofargu-
ment with a complete disregard for the evidential context in which the argument
occurs. Much of what constitutes fallacy theory has been justly criticised for its
failure to grasp the full significance of this issue:
... let us examine ... the description of various devices which I wish to call
by the neutral term of "disputed practices" [fallacies]. One problem with
these descriptions is that they are usually prejudicial in the sense that their
fallaciousness is built right into their description. . . . There is a pattern in
these biased descriptions, and it is the foIIowing. If the disputed practice is a
type Of inductive argument, namely one claiming that the conclusion is only
strongly, but not conclusively, supported by the premises, then the practice
will be described as a type of deductive argument, namely one claiming that
the conclusion is conclusively supported by the premises. If the disputed
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practice is a type of what might be called a partial argument, namely one
claiming that the conclusion is only partly, but not too strongly supported
by the premises, then the practice will be described as a type of allegedly
inductively strong argument. One might think that the pattern runs out of
material here, but it can be extended as follows: if the disputed practice is a
type of non-argument, namely not an attempt to support one proposition
with others, then it will be described as an argument claiming that certain
propositions provide at least some support for another (the conclusion).
Finally, if the disputed practice is an argument having as conclusion a special
type of proposition, then it will be described as an argument having another
conclusion; the pattern (or shall I say the fallacy?) is that of exaggerating the
strength of the connection claimed between various assertions or of creating
one where none is claimed. (Finocchiaro, 1981, pp. 15-16)
In effect, any argument can be described as fallacious when we set about its
evaluation on the basis of inappropriate standards ofevidence.' More specifically,
the criteria by means of which we judge the acceptability of evidence within one
argumentative context should not be generalised to other, evidentially bereft argu-
mentative contexts. Option (3}--the changing of normative standards to facilitate
inquiry against a background of evidential bereftness--emerges as the only viable
alternative to the various negative scenarios described so far. How petitio principii
features within these normative standards has been examined only very generally
to this stage. I now expand upon that account by returning to the Woods and
Walton petitio with which we began.
In the discussion so far, the expression 'evidential bereftness' has been used to
refer to contexts of cognitive inquiry which are lacking in evidence, evidence
which is independent of the conclusion of a process of inquiry. However, little
mention has been made of the various reasons why evidential bereftness comes to
characterise certain contexts of inquiry. I want to say something of these reasons,
as doing so will clarify the relevance of the foregoing remarks concerning the
normative assessment of argument in general under conditions of evidential
bereftness to the specific case of the normative assessment of petitio principii.
More specifically, I want to present petitioprincipii in a positive light, as a strat-
egy of reasoning which can facilitate the progress of inquiry-and, thus, forms
part of the normative framework described in relation to option (3) above-and
not as a form ofargument which is inherently fallacious. The most obvious reason
why an inquiry might be evidentially bereft relates to the immaturity ofthat inquiry.
When an inquiry is in its early stages ofdevelopment, evidence which is independ-
ent of the conclusion of that inquiry may be lacking for the simple reason that the
period of time to elapse since the commencement of that inquiry has been insuffi-
cient for the purposes of gathering conclusion independent evidence. However,
conclusion-independent evidence may also be lacking in the case where the con-
tent of the conclusion is such that only evidence of identical content to that con-
clusion can possibly confirm that conclusion. This latter scenario, I contend, char-
acterises the petitio argument of Woods and Walton. Moreover if, as it was argued
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above, an inquirer can ill-afford to suspend cognitive inquiry until the time when
conclusion-independent evidence becomes available, it is all the more important
that the proponent of a Woods- and Walton-type petitio argument does not opt to
suspend inquiry the very content of the conclusion of such a petitio argument
precludes the possibility that a time will be reached when conclusion-independent
evidence becomes available. This second type of bereftness, I want to argue, is
inevitable in view of the content of the conclusions of certain arguments. I now
want to demonstrate this inevitability in the case of the argument of Woods and
Walton.
When we consider the conclusion of the Woods and Walton petitio-one's
claim to know the thesis is deficient-we come to realise that the only evidence
that we could possibly use to warrant such a proposition must relate to the inad-
equacy of the grounds for holding a thesis, Le. the proposition that is the premise
of the argument. The very content of the question-at-issue imposes specific con-
straints on the evidence that can be used in this case. This can be illustrated by an
examination of the issues discussed by Woods and Walton (l982a) prior to the
premise ofthe petitio. The premise one's grounds for holding the thesis are inad-
equate is preceded in argument by the proposition one's thesis has been refuted in
the weak sense. As Woods and Walton (I982a) define refutation in the weak sense,
it is the state of affairs which exists when the conclusion ofthe argument obtains,
that is when one's claim to know the thesis is deficient-the truth of a thesis is a
presupposition of its knowability and it is the establishment of such truth which is
lacking when we claim to have refuted a thesis in the weak sense. To attempt a
claim to knowledge under such circumstances would simply present the know-
ledge-claim as deficient: the 'irrespective of whether that thesis is true or false' of
weak refutation is the all-important consideration for any claim to knowledge. The
pattern of justification in this argument can now be demonstrated as follows:
Woods/Walton
argument:
Pattern of
justification:
One's grounds for holding the thesis are inadequate.
:. One's claim to know the thesis is deficient.
One's thesis has been refuted in the weak sense.
(proposition identical in content to conclusion)
J-
On,', grounds (0' holding the thesis ore inadeoua... J
(premise of argument)
J-
One's claim to know the thesis is deficient.
(conclusion of argument)
[~ = entailment relation]
I have suggested that the Woods and Walton petitio has a condition of evidential
bereftness imposed on it by the very nature of the content of the argument-the
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only conceivable way in which to warrant the conclusion that one's claim to know
the thesis is deficient is to employ the premise one's grounds for holding the thesis
are inadequate. In view of the fact that we are restricted in the evidence that we
can use to warrant the conclusion, we cannot then proceed to bemoan a situation
in which that conclusion entails the premise. The movement from premise to
conclusion and subsequently from conclusion to premise very obviously violates a
priority condition which is often discussed in relation to argument. Walton and
Batten (1984) describe this condition as follows:
The assumption is that the evidentiary well-knownness of A, in order to
make A of utility as a premiss, must be prior to that of B. Once the deduction
is granted however, the value of B should be adjusted upwards to a plausibil-
ity value equal to (and not greater than) A. Once A has been so utilized as a
premiss for B however, B could never be used as a premiss in an argument
that has A as a conclusion. Reason: to be useful as a premiss, the value of B
must be greater than that of A. But as was just shown above, the value of B
should not be greater than that of A, if A has been used as a premiss for B in
a previous deduction. Thus arguing in a circle, from A to B, and then subse-
quently from B to A, violates some requirementof evidential priority. (p. 154).
However, this violation of the priority condition on argument can only result in an
evaluation of fallaciousness for the argument in which it occurs when the context
of that argument is clearly one in which considerations of priority are important. It
is far from clear that Woods and Walton intend the premise in this case to have any
such priority over the conclusion: they appear equally prepared to argue from
conclusion to premise when they use the refutation ofa thesis in the weak sense (a
condition in which neither the truth nor the falsity of a thesis has been established
and as such a condition under which a claim to knowledge would be deficient) as
evidence for the inadequacy of the grounds that have been adduced for holding the
thesis. Walton (1985) discusses the possible non-fallaciousness of this lack of
priority within argument:
However, in the majority of circular arguments we looked at, the circularity
cannot be condemned as wrong or fallacious precisely because the context
of dialogue fails to indicate decisively that a priority condition is a proce-
dural requirement. The economist's argument we began with, for example,
should not be declared fallacious or viciously circular by a reasonable critic
unless the critic can cite evidence of an agreement, or at least a clearly agreed
upon context or background requirement to argue only in one direction or
the other. Similarly for the mathematician. If the objective (the problem) is to
prove from A to B, and also from B to A, there need be no fallacy in solving
the problem by arguing in a circle. (p. 272)
The non-fallaciousness ofthe Woods and Walton argument can be summarized as
follows. The content of the conclusion-to-be-proved imposed a condition of evi-
dential bereftness on the context ofargument. The condition ofevidential bereftness
functioned primarily by effecting changes in the argument's priority requirments.
No longer constrained by these requirements, Woods and Walton are at liberty to
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argue from conclusion to premise as well as from premise to conclusion. What is
clear is that a charge of fallacy is only defensible when the purpose of argumenta-
tion is to move from a state of what is better known, or more plausible, to that
which is less well known, or less plausible, for this is what petitio principii cannot
achieve. The purpose of argumentation need not, however, reflect a concern for
such priority requirements.
In the above discussion, I have been concerned to argue for the view that
petitio principii is non-fallacious in the special context of evidential bereftness in
cognitive inquiry. However also on this view,petitio principii has been character-
ised in a positive way, as a form ofreasoning or argument which contributes to the
process ofjustification in cognitive inquiry, and not simply in a negative way, as a
form of argument which is not fallacious in certain contexts of cognitive inquiry.
Roy Sorensen is also committed to the view that petitio principii can, in certain
cases, contribute to the process ofjustification (in Sorensen's terms, rational per-
suasion) in argument. Indeed, Sorensen's thesis that 'a variety of arguments hav-
ing the form 'P, therefore, P' do not beg the question' (1991, p. 245) is similar to
my own thesis. This similarity warrants a brief examination in the present context
of Sorensen's claims in relation to petitio principii.
Sorensen's position can be described as follows: an argument which exhibits a
question-begging form (where this is defined as propositional identity of premise
and conclusion) can, in certain cases, function as a rationally persuasive argu-
ment. Sorensen concludes that because certain 'P, therefore, P' arguments are
rationally persuasive, they cannot be viewed as question-begging or circular in
nature (hence, the 'without circularity' in the title ofSorensen's paper). Sorensen's
ultimate conclusion is that such a state of affairs commits irreparable damage to
the syntactic theorist's conception of circularity. The particular feature of argu-
ments that Sorensen is concerned to investigate is that of exemplification. Al-
though Sorensen never explicitly defines exemplification, the idea that he has in
mind is quite clearly conveyed by a number of examples. Sorensen begins an
illustration ofthis notion be employing two arguments which do not display premise
and conclusion identity and accordingly are not of the form 'P, therefore, P':
(B 1) If there are syllogisms, then information can be combined.
There are syllogisms.
:. Information can be combined.
(B2) An argument with a missing premise is an enthymeme.
:. There is an enthymeme on this page.
Sorensen explains the process of exemplification in relation to these two argu-
ments as follows: 'Since (B1) is an argument with two premises, it is a syllogism
and hence evidence for its second premise, which in turn enhances the credibility
of the conclusion. Argument (B2) is itself an enthymeme and so ensures the truth
of its own conclusion' (p. 248). It is clear that for Sorensen exemplification as-
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sumes an evidential role within argument. It is also clear that in relation to the 'P,
therefore, P' arguments that Sorensen describes as rationally persuasive, exempli-
fication must function as a source of evidence for the conclusions of these argu-
ments, a source of evidence which is entirely independent of these conclusions-
ifthis independence condition is not satisfied, then the argument in question fails in
its task of rational persuasion: instead of dealing with arguments of the form 'P,
therefore, P' which are not circular, we are dealing with arguments ofthe form 'P,
therefore, P' which are circular. Certainly this role of exemplification is borne out
by the following example advanced by Sorensen:
(E1) Some sentences are exactly seven words long.
:. Some sentences are exactly seven words long.
In (E1) the existential generalisation that is the conclusion receives evidential sup-
port from exemplification which is based on the premise alone. However it is clear
that, on occasion, exemplification, as conceived by Sorensen, fails as a mode of
rational persuasion. To see this, consider the following example:
(Cl) Some arguments are written in black ink.
:. Some arguments are written in black ink.
In relationto (Cl), Sorensen argues: 'In addition to being sound, (Cl) is rationally
persuasive. A person who doubted the conclusion comes to know it is true by
considering the argument' (p. 248). It is difficult to see, however, how (C1) is
rationally persuasive. As part of our 'considering the argument', we must also
consider the conclusion. The conclusion in this case is part of the exemplification
by means of which a sceptic is 'persuaded' of the truth of the conclusion. In this
way, evidence in support of the conclusion of this argument is not independent of
the conclusion. Sorensen's exemplification has, on this occasion, failed in its task
of rational persuasion.
Notwithstanding Sorensen's unfortunate use of the example (Cl), it is clear
that Sorensen has found in exemplification a novel method of analysis, not simply
of question-begging argument, but of the notion of justification in argument in
general. Sorensen calls this alternative view ofargument justification ontic persua-
sion. He distinguishes ontic persuasion from the standard view of argument justi-
fication in the following way:
'Reason' sometimes refers to a justifying proposition and sometimes refers
to the things the proposition is about. Thus I may explain my hospitalization
with the propositional reason 'My leg broke', or by pointing to my broken
leg as my "ontic" reason. We are used to thinking of arguments as aiming to
have premises that are propositional reasons for their conclusions, but the
(B) - (E) cases show that an argument itself can be an ontic reason for its
conclusion. (1991, p. 253)
Although I have already indicated a difficulty for Sorensen's account of the
non-circularity of petitio principii which is presented by the view that 'an argu-
ment itself can be an ontic reason for its conclusion', the non-propositional nature
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of ontic persuasion opens the way for an evaluation of non-fallaciousness to be
applied to an argument which, in terms of its propositional structure, displays
complete circularity. Indeed, the non-propositional basis of ontic persuasion re-
veals a relevance of this form of persuasion to the present discussion of cognitive
inquiry under conditions of evidential bereftness. The relevance is this: non-
propositional persuasion, of which exemplification is an example, is, on the basis
of the analysis of this form of persuasion presented by Sorensen, an appropriate
reasoning strategy for contexts of inquiry which are evidentially bereft on account
ofa lack ofpropositional knowledge. This lack ofknowledge, it was argued above,
can be seen to characterise immature inquiries, that is, inquiries which are in the
very early stages of their development. A non-propositional mode of rational per-
suasion can facilitate the progress of such an inquiry, at least until a time when
sufficient knowledge has been acquired by that inquiry to permit justification to
proceed by propositional means. Even when such knowledge is acquired, non-
propositional persuasion might continue to operate alongside propositional modes
of justification in grounding theses in cognitive inquiry. Of course, these uses of
non-propositional persuasion are dependent in turn on the demonstration ofa much
wider domain ofapplication for exemplification than that which has been achieved
by Sorensen (Sorensen himself is aware of the limited application of exemplifica-
tion in 'P, therefore, P' arguments when he writes: 'Self-supporting 'P, therefore,
p' arguments are seldom propounded because we are rarely interested in establish-
ing the sort of conclusions they demonstrate' (1991, p. 250)). However, my inter-
est in exemplification in the above discussion has not been with the type ofconclu-
sions that it validates, but rather with the type ofanalysis that it makes possible, an
analysis to the effect that certain 'P, therefore, P' arguments are non-fallacious/
non-circular/non-question-begging in nature.
Notes
* This paper was written while the author was in receipt of the Eila Campbell Memorial Award
from the British Federation ofWomen Graduates. The author wishes to express her gratitude to
the Federation for its financial assistance. The comments ofa referee ofthisjoumal on an earlier
version of this paper are gratefully acknowledged.
I It is necessary to draw the reader's attention to a confusion in terminology which may arise
during the discussion ofthis particular argument. Such confusion may come about by the fact
that we are examining what is, in effect, an argument which is itselfabout aspects ofargument.
For example, in describing the question-begging nature ofthis argument, I will have occasion to
discuss the entailment relationships which exist between premise and conclusion (route (I» and
conclusion and premise (route (2)). This is distinct from the evidential relationships discussed
within the premise and conclusion as separate entities, i.e., how the grounds which we can
adduce in support of a thesis stand in an evidential relationship to that thesis. This latter type
ofevidential relationship relates to premise and conclusion content and, contrary to the views of
many theorists in the area, is essential to any adequate account of what constitutes a question-
begging argument. This issue is discussed further in the main text.
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1 Central to Rescher's analysis are the concepts of categorical assertion, cautious assertion and
provisoed assertion:
(1) Categorical assertion
lP for "P is the case" or "It is maintained (by me, the assertor) that P".
The proponent's opening move of a disputation must take this categorical form.
(2) Cautious assertion
+P for "P is the case for all that you (the adversary) have shown" "P's being the case is
compatible with everything you've said (i.e., have maintained or conceded)".
Moves of the l-type can be made only by the proponent, those of the +-type only by the
opponent.
(3) Provisoed assertion
P/Q for "P generally (or usually or ordinarily) obtains provided that Q" or "P obtains, other
things being equal, when Q does" or "When Q, so ceteris paribus does P" or "P obtains in all
(or most) ordinary circumstances (or possible worlds) when Q does" or "Q constitutes prima
facie evidence for P".
NOTE: This move must always be accompanied by one of the two preceding forms of asser
tion of its operative condition Q. Note also that corresponding forms ofdenial arise wheu-P
stands inplace ofP. (1977, p.6)
3 It might, ofcourse, be argued that a petitio principii argument is only evident on the assumption
that the proponent's thesis at stage (I) is !P, but that there is nothing in Rescher's passage to
indicate that this is the case. However, for the opponent at stage (I) to produce a cautious denial
of the form +-P, the proponent's thesis at (1) must be IP. The options available for the propo-
nent's thesis at (I) are as follows:
(I) P
(2) Q
(3) -P
(4) -Q
If the proponent's thesis had a content other than P (options 2 and 4 above), the opponent's
response of +-P would clearly have been irrelevant. Similarly, if the proponent's thesis had
taken the form of a negative assertion (options 3 and 4), the opponent's response would have
been a mere repetition of the proponent's thesis in option 3, in which case it would hardly rank
as a countermove, or alternatively an irrelevancy in option 4. The only option which avoids
rendering the opponent's thesis at (I) as completely nonsensical is P.
4 It may be argued that I am describing as one notion what are, in effect, two separate notions, that
ofevidence and inference after all, is Finocchiaro not describing inference, 'the connection .. _
between various assertions'? While evidence and inference are distinct notions, they are interde-
pendent in their mode of operation. On the one hand, it is often the case that inferences play a
role in the process by which we obtain evidence from perception. On the other hand, inferences
are only ever as strong as the evidence which supports them (cf. Sidgwick's 'ground of infer-
ence '). In the following argument:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
:. Socrates is mortal.
the conclusion is established conclusively by means ofa deductive inference from the premises.
The strength of this inference derives from the universally quantified proposition which consti-
tutes the major premise ofthe argument that is, it is the' strength ofthe evidence represented by
this premise which confers a corresponding strength on the inferential move from premises to
conclusion.
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